0
    • Common Reads Library Marketing
    0 0
    Download high-resolution image Look inside

    Anticipating Instability

    Assessing and Removing Risks Before They Happen

    Author Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Alastair Smith
    Look inside
    Paperback
    $75.00 US
    | $99.00 CAN
    The MIT Press
    On sale Dec 23, 2025 | 432 Pages | 9780262553759
    Add to cart Add to list Exam Copies

    See Additional Formats
    View on Edelweiss
    A theory of politics that looks at what did not happen—or non-events—to explain policy change, economic development, democratization, and “autocratization.”

    Anticipating Instability puts forward a general theory of politics that attempts to explain the very many destabilizing political events in history that did not happen. Although most of us do not pay close attention to what did not occur, research shows that fear of non-events does more to redefine how people are governed than does the actual realization of coups and revolutions.

    In unraveling the dogs that didn’t bark, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith analyze how, when, and why leaders who believe their hold on power is at risk focus their political survival efforts on adjusting their policy choices or shifting their government’s accountability. Such adjustments are the essential factors that determine whether a society becomes freer, more transparent, and prosperous—or more oppressive, corrupt, and impoverished.

    The book is unique in that it develops a general theory of politics using game theory reasoning and then tests dozens of hypotheses derived from the theory’s logic using both statistical methods and illustrative case studies.
    ENDORSEMENTS

    “This is a pathbreaking book. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith have developed ways of understanding two issues central to political leadership, especially in dictatorships: leaders’ preemptive responses to challenges that have not yet materialized, and the way leaders’ personal time horizons affect the decisions made by their closest supporters, and thus leader survival and regime longevity. Everyone interested in how dictatorships work, regime change, or democratic backsliding should read this book.”
    —Barbara Geddes, Professor Emerita, University of California, Los Angeles

    “Anticipating Instability is a tour de force. Expanding their influential selectorate theory, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith show why it’s not coups or revolutions—but rather the fear of them—that explains the policies, institutions, and survival of autocrats and democrats alike. Unified by a single, powerful political logic, this book is a master class in both the realities and the science of politics.”
    —Milan Svolik, Professor, Yale University; author of The Politics of Authoritarian Rule

    “This book has a remarkable aim: to understand episodes of political instability that did not occur due to forward-looking actions. To do so, they extend their influential selectorate theory into new domains, explaining along the way why the apparently irrational may sometimes serve a strategic purpose. The book is a significant feat demonstrating the power of formal modelling in understanding issues that matter.”
    —Tim Besley, School Professor of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science

    “A major advance in our understanding of political economy. Essential reading in our uncertain and perilous world.”
    —James A. Robinson, 2024 Nobel Prize Winner; Professor, University of Chicago

    “Anticipating Instability extends selectorate theory to consider rulers who are constantly on the lookout for nascent threats to their continuation in office. This work will be required reading for all those interested in authoritarian politics and the slippery slope between democracies and nondemocracies.”
    —Gary W. Cox, William Bennett Munro Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

    “From modeling Putin’s bare chest to an incredibly rich set of political strategies, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith extend their influential selectorate theory to account for previously unexamined cases where political action is explained as moves by leaders to prevent their deposition. Mathematical at root, empirical for support, and anecdotal for engagement, this challenging book is a whirlwind of insight.”
    —David D. Laitin, James T. Watkins IV and Elise V. Watkins Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

    “What drives the behavior of autocrats, and how do they manage to consolidate and retain power? This important book provides an illuminating framework to answer this fundamental question. Combining theory, evidence, and historical analysis, it provides simple but compelling explanations of complex political events. A really pathbreaking contribution to understand what is going on in many parts of the world. “
    —Guido Tabellini, Intesa Sanpaolo Chair in Political Economics, Bocconi University
    oth statistical methods and illustrative case studies.
    Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is the Silver Professor of Politics at NYU; is a Founding Partner of Selectors, LLC; and has written or coauthored 26 books, including The Invention of Power, The Logic of Political Survival, and The Dictator’s Handbook. A Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Council on Foreign Relations and the recipient of the DMZ Peace Prize, a Guggenheim Fellowship, and numerous academic awards, he holds honorary degrees from the Universities of Groningen and Haifa.

    Alastair Smith is the Bernhardt Denmark Chair of International Politics and a Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University. He is a Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has written or coauthored multiple books including The Dictator's Handbook and The Logic of Political Survival.
    Bruce Bueno De Mesquita View titles by Bruce Bueno De Mesquita
    Alastair Smith View titles by Alastair Smith
    Preface
    Acknowledgements
    1 Preempting Trouble
    2 Selectorate Theory I
    3 Selectorate Theory II
    4 Estimating Key Quantities
    5 Anticipating Threats and Risks
    6 Responding to Threats
    7 Survival
    8 Practical Applications
    Appendix 2: Basic Selectorate Model with Extensions
    Appendix 3: Dynamic Selectorate Approach
    Appendix 5: Conditions for Instability
    Appendix 6: Leader Response to Threats
    Appendix 7: Survival Analyses
    Index

    About

    A theory of politics that looks at what did not happen—or non-events—to explain policy change, economic development, democratization, and “autocratization.”

    Anticipating Instability puts forward a general theory of politics that attempts to explain the very many destabilizing political events in history that did not happen. Although most of us do not pay close attention to what did not occur, research shows that fear of non-events does more to redefine how people are governed than does the actual realization of coups and revolutions.

    In unraveling the dogs that didn’t bark, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith analyze how, when, and why leaders who believe their hold on power is at risk focus their political survival efforts on adjusting their policy choices or shifting their government’s accountability. Such adjustments are the essential factors that determine whether a society becomes freer, more transparent, and prosperous—or more oppressive, corrupt, and impoverished.

    The book is unique in that it develops a general theory of politics using game theory reasoning and then tests dozens of hypotheses derived from the theory’s logic using both statistical methods and illustrative case studies.

    Reviews

    ENDORSEMENTS

    “This is a pathbreaking book. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith have developed ways of understanding two issues central to political leadership, especially in dictatorships: leaders’ preemptive responses to challenges that have not yet materialized, and the way leaders’ personal time horizons affect the decisions made by their closest supporters, and thus leader survival and regime longevity. Everyone interested in how dictatorships work, regime change, or democratic backsliding should read this book.”
    —Barbara Geddes, Professor Emerita, University of California, Los Angeles

    “Anticipating Instability is a tour de force. Expanding their influential selectorate theory, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith show why it’s not coups or revolutions—but rather the fear of them—that explains the policies, institutions, and survival of autocrats and democrats alike. Unified by a single, powerful political logic, this book is a master class in both the realities and the science of politics.”
    —Milan Svolik, Professor, Yale University; author of The Politics of Authoritarian Rule

    “This book has a remarkable aim: to understand episodes of political instability that did not occur due to forward-looking actions. To do so, they extend their influential selectorate theory into new domains, explaining along the way why the apparently irrational may sometimes serve a strategic purpose. The book is a significant feat demonstrating the power of formal modelling in understanding issues that matter.”
    —Tim Besley, School Professor of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science

    “A major advance in our understanding of political economy. Essential reading in our uncertain and perilous world.”
    —James A. Robinson, 2024 Nobel Prize Winner; Professor, University of Chicago

    “Anticipating Instability extends selectorate theory to consider rulers who are constantly on the lookout for nascent threats to their continuation in office. This work will be required reading for all those interested in authoritarian politics and the slippery slope between democracies and nondemocracies.”
    —Gary W. Cox, William Bennett Munro Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

    “From modeling Putin’s bare chest to an incredibly rich set of political strategies, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith extend their influential selectorate theory to account for previously unexamined cases where political action is explained as moves by leaders to prevent their deposition. Mathematical at root, empirical for support, and anecdotal for engagement, this challenging book is a whirlwind of insight.”
    —David D. Laitin, James T. Watkins IV and Elise V. Watkins Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

    “What drives the behavior of autocrats, and how do they manage to consolidate and retain power? This important book provides an illuminating framework to answer this fundamental question. Combining theory, evidence, and historical analysis, it provides simple but compelling explanations of complex political events. A really pathbreaking contribution to understand what is going on in many parts of the world. “
    —Guido Tabellini, Intesa Sanpaolo Chair in Political Economics, Bocconi University

    Author

    oth statistical methods and illustrative case studies.
    Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is the Silver Professor of Politics at NYU; is a Founding Partner of Selectors, LLC; and has written or coauthored 26 books, including The Invention of Power, The Logic of Political Survival, and The Dictator’s Handbook. A Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Council on Foreign Relations and the recipient of the DMZ Peace Prize, a Guggenheim Fellowship, and numerous academic awards, he holds honorary degrees from the Universities of Groningen and Haifa.

    Alastair Smith is the Bernhardt Denmark Chair of International Politics and a Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University. He is a Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has written or coauthored multiple books including The Dictator's Handbook and The Logic of Political Survival.
    Bruce Bueno De Mesquita View titles by Bruce Bueno De Mesquita
    Alastair Smith View titles by Alastair Smith

    Table of Contents

    Preface
    Acknowledgements
    1 Preempting Trouble
    2 Selectorate Theory I
    3 Selectorate Theory II
    4 Estimating Key Quantities
    5 Anticipating Threats and Risks
    6 Responding to Threats
    7 Survival
    8 Practical Applications
    Appendix 2: Basic Selectorate Model with Extensions
    Appendix 3: Dynamic Selectorate Approach
    Appendix 5: Conditions for Instability
    Appendix 6: Leader Response to Threats
    Appendix 7: Survival Analyses
    Index

    Additional formats

    Other Books by this Author

    Penguin Random House Library Marketing

    © 2026 Penguin Random House

    Back to Top
    0
    Wish List (0)
    • More Websites from
      Penguin Random House
    • Common Reads
    • Library Marketing